This paper presents a benchmark endogenous growth model including biodiversity preservation dynamics. Producing food requires land, and increasing the share of total land devoted to farming mechanically reduces the share of land devoted to biodiversity conservation. However, the safeguarding of a greater number of species is associated to better ecosystem services pollination, ood control, pest control, etc., which in turn ensure a lower volatility of agricultural productivity. The optimal conversion/preservation rule is explicitly characterized, as well as the value (in terms of the welfare cost of biodiversity losses) of biological diversity. The Epstein-Zin-Weil specication of the utility function allows us to disentangle the eects of risk aversion and aversion to uctuations.
Introduction
From 1999 to 2008, 48 000 square kilometers of wildland have been turned into cropland. In 2013, croplands covered 12% of earth ice-free surface; annually, more than 10% of the earth's net primary production is turned into crops (Phalan et al. [5] ). This destruction of habitats and natural ecosystems for agricultural purposes, useful and inevitable as it may appear, is increasingly questioned. Natural ecosystems provide a wide range of goods and services, such as control of the local climate, clean water provision, ood control, maintenance of soil fertility, pollination, or pest control. The destruction of natural habitats causes species extinction and thus a loss in biodiversity.
Ironically, a growing body of evidence shows that biodiversity destruction generates signicant costs for the agricultural activity. In particular, it appears to amplify volatility in agricultural output. Indeed, biodiversity destruction negatively impacts the climatic, hydrological and, more generally, ecological environment, which may in turn aects negatively variability of agricultural productivity in time (Fuglie and Nin-Pratt [12] , de Mazancourt et al. [6] ).
Thus, biodiversity acts as a form of insurance, and this is likely a main determinant of its overall value. The insurance value of biodiversity has been analyzed in a series of groundbreaking studies by Baumgärtner [3] , Quaas and Baumgärtner [24] , [25] and Baumgärtner and Strunz [4] . These studies, however, rely on static models under partial equilibrium.
We provide the rst analysis of biodiversity as insurance in a stochastic dynamic setup.
Precisely, we study a dynamic problem of optimal land conversion in a stylized stochastic endogenous growth model where (1) increasing the share of land devoted to farming allows to increase agricultural production at the expense of biodiversity; (2) agricultural productivity evolves stochastically around an exogenous deterministic trend, with a volatility that negatively depends on biodiversity.
To better study insurance issues in a dynamic context, we follow the approach pioneered by Epstein and Zin (Epstein and Zin [10] , [11] , Due and Epstein [7] ) and we represent preferences by a recursive utility function. In this way, we are able to disentangle aversion to intertemporal uctuations and relative risk aversion. The risk aversion parameter quanties the preference for certain rather than uncertain outcomes and it only makes sense in a stochastic context (but even in static models), conversely, the aversion to intertemporal uctuations, i.e. the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, measures the propensity to smooth the consumption over time and it is a fundamental parameter also in deterministic dynamic models; in typical endogenous growth models, when the growth rate is positive, it takes for instance the form of the willingness of increasing the level of the consumption at the expense of its growth rate. Several studies 1 in the eld of natural resources and the environment prove indeed that these two logically distinct concepts cannot satisfyingly be embodied in a single parameter as it happens when the intertemporally additive expected utility is considered.
We develop our approach in two stages. We rst characterize the optimal allocation of land to farming. We then consider two farmers exploiting a common land in the absence of well-dened property rights. We study how the equilibrium allocation of land diers from the social optimum.
We show that the optimal share of land devoted to farming is constant over time. It increases with the social discount rate and decreases with risk aversion. It increases with aversion to uctuations when the average trend of agricultural productivity is larger than the discount rate, but decreases with aversion to uctuations in the opposite case.
We then compute the value of biodiversity, dened in reference to Lucas [20] , [21] as the welfare cost of biodiversity losses between the optimal solution and a solution where total land conversion is achieved. We study the determinants of this particular value of biodiversity, 1 In a model of reservoir management, Howitt et al. [17] show that the intertemporal additive expected utility function does not t their data, whereas the recursive utility function does. Peltola and Knapp [23] use recursive utility to study forestry management, and Lybbert and McPeak [22] for the trade-o among dierent livestock among Kenyan pastoralists. They highlight empirically the distinct values that should be taken by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion parameters. Ha-Duong and Treich [16] evaluate policies in a context of global warming; it is shown that the optimal policy responds dierently to variation of the intertemporal substitution parameter and the risk aversion one. The same result is observed by Knapp and Olson [18] for rangeland and groundwater management. They consider the eect of both parameters on the optimal decision rule, showing in particular that if intertemporal substitution has a major eect, risk aversion does not impact the optimal policy. The dierent role of the two parameters is also proved in Epaulard and Pommeret [9] in the context of extraction of a non-renewable resource in a continuous time framework.
interpreted as in insurance against the volatility of agricultural productivity. We show that it is an increasing function of risk aversion, but that the eect of aversion to uctuations on this value is ambiguous.
In the two-player extension of the model the behavior of the two farmers are supposed to coordinate so that the system reaches a Nash equilibrium of the game. We highlight the systematic over-exploitation of the natural resource with respect to the previously described social optimum due to the volatility externalities. We show that the increment in area devoted to farming is decreasing with the aversion and it tends to vanish when the it is very high.
Our analysis contributes to three literature. We advance, rst, a nascent theoretical literature on the insurance value of biodiversity. As we already emphasized above, we are interested here in the link between biodiversity and ecological environment destruction 2 , and ecosystem variability (climate, water provision, ood control, maintenance of soil fertility, pollination...). This kind of interaction between biodiversity preservation and incertitude substantially diers from portfolio dierentiation arguments used, for instance, by Weitzman [28] where the word biodiversity is intended as the number of cultivated varieties.
A series of papers by Baumgärtner, Quaas and Strunz ( [3] , [24] , [25] and [4] ) theoretically analyses the phenomenon in a series of static models. Of course the static context can be a limitation because the eects of the biodiversity degradation accumulate and spread over time. We propose the rst stochastic dynamic model in this literature. In our model the volatility of the agricultural productivity depends on the whole historical path of the biodiversity preservation decisions. Observe that the dynamic context is essential to being able to speak about elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the of uctuations aversion.
This remark brings us to a second stream of literature: our paper also contributes to a small but growing literature on natural resources that disentangles intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. In dierent contexts, Krautkraemer et al. [19] , Howitt et al. [17] , Peltola and Knapp [23] , Lybbert and McPeak [22] , Ha-Duong and Treich [16] and Knapp and Olson [18] show that the recursive utility can better t the data than the intertemporal additive expected utility because the same parameter cannot be used to represent intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. In the specic case of the relation between optimal growth and biodiversity 2 The two are in strict relation, being linked by the species-area relationship, see Rosenzweig [26] . conservation we show that the optimal allocation of the land responds qualitatively dierently to the two parameters.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games in continuous time. Indeed, even if continuous time stochastic game are frequent in various areas of economic theory (natural resource exploitation, capital accumulation, oligopoly theory), see for instance Van Long [27] or Haunschmied et al. [15] , to the best of our knowledge, this is the rst continuous time model in the economic theory literature where a model with a Nash equilibrium of a game with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences is used.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the basics of the model. We explicitly solve it to obtain the optimal land conversion rate in section 3, and we compute the value of biodiversity in section 4. In section 5, we solve the two-player common property resource game and compare its outcome to the optimal solution. Section 6 concludes. We collect all the proofs of the results in the Appendix.
2
The model
We build a highly stylized model, the simplest we can think of that allows us to compute the value of biodiversity as an insurance device against agricultural productivity uctuations. We rst present the model and its optimal solution, and then come to the determination of the value of biodiversity.
We consider an agricultural economy. We describe the problem of a planner or of the unique farmer living in this economy. She owns a stock L = 1 of land and she has to decide how to allocate it into two possible intended uses: farming and biodiversity preservation.
For t ≥ 0, we respectively denote by f (t) ∈ [0, 1] and 1−f (t) ∈ [0, 1] the share of land used respectively to farming and to maintain biodiversity. According to the well known speciesarea curve rst proposed in the 20's by O. Arrhenius [2] and H. Gleason [8] , as the number of species is constrained by available land, the level of biodiversity B(t) depends on the area of land left undeveloped:
where the function g(·) is concave and usually specied as a power function.
We assume that agricultural production at time t is given by:
where A(t) is the productivity of a unit of land devoted to farming at time t, which dynamics is described by a stochastic dierential equation (SDE). More precisely, given a complete probability space (Ω, F, P) and a real standard Brownian motion W : [0, +∞) × Ω → R, adapted to some ltration F t , we assume that A(t) is a solution of the following SDE:
In such an expression, α ∈ R represents some (xed and exogenous) parameter of technological progress in farming activities (it can be equal to 0). The term f (t)σ measures the volatility of agricultural productivity. The exogenous part σ > 0 represents the intrinsic volatility, due for instance to weather (oods, droughts, etc.). Total volatility decreases as the land devoted to biodiversity preservation, and then biodiversity itself, increases 3 . It is in that sense that biodiversity appears in the model as an insurance against adverse outcomes.
We suppose that at each time t ≥ 0 all the production is consumed, so that:
This assumption is not innocuous. It implies that there is no precautionary saving: the economy cannot store or save a part of agricultural production to hedge against the risk of a bad future productivity.
The planner maximizes, over the set of the [0, 1]-valued F t -adapted processes, an aggregate social welfare criterion in form of an innite horizon, continuous time, Epstein-Zin-Weil utility function characterized by a constant relative risk aversion θ (positive and dierent from 1),
an intertemporal elasticity of φ −1 > 0 and a discount rate ρ > 0. Recall that the case θ = φ corresponds to the usual time additive expected utility function. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution φ can also be interpreted as a measure of aversion to uctuations, as an agent with a high φ prefers to smooth consumption over time 4 .
As proved in Example 3 page 367 of Due and Epstein [7] , the corresponding aggregator can be written as:
We denote by V (A 0 ) the value function of the described problem.
Remark 2.1. In an informal way, as, for instance, in Epaulard and Pommeret [9] , we could represent the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences using an innitesimal representation, having the advantage of being easily linked to the denition of discrete-time recursive utility. In this context the utility at period t depends on current consumption as well as on the certain equivalent U of future utility:
being U (t + dt) the quantity:
The optimal land conversion rate
The following conditions, that we will always suppose to be veried in the following, will be shown to be necessary to ensure that the value function remains nite and to express explicitly its value.
Hypothesis 3.1. The parameters satisfy the following conditions:
Observe in particular that the second inequality in (5) is always satised if φ > 1, and that the third inequality requires that either θ, φ < 1 or θ, φ > 1. If θ = φ, as in the expected utility case, this third condition is always satised. Under Hypothesis 3.1 the value of the positive constant
will be important to distinguish between interior and corner solutions. In the two following propositions we will see what happens when this constant is greater or smaller than 1. We begin by describing the dynamics of the system in the interior solution case.
Proposition 3.2. Let Hypothesis 3.1 be satised. Assume that:
Then the value function of the problem can be written explicitly. It is equal to:
where
The optimal control is constant and deterministic, and it is given by:
Finally, (5) guarantees the respect of the transversality condition.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3.3. The optimal conversion rate f * is an increasing function of the discount rate ρ, a decreasing function of the intrinsic volatility of agricultural productivity σ, and a decreasing function of risk aversion θ. It is also a decreasing function of aversion to uctuations φ if ρ − α > 0, but an increasing function of aversion to uctuations if ρ − α < 0.
Proof. Straightforward derivations of (9) give the results.
The rst three results are consistent to intuition. The higher the discount rate that is the more impatient society is, the less it cares about the future and the less it wants to ensure against future uncertainty. Such a society has a strong incentive to convert a large part of land to agriculture to enjoy present food consumption. Likewise, the higher intrinsic volatility and the more risk averse society is, the more it wants to ensure against future uncertainty.
In a sense the eect of increasing the risk aversion parameter can be seen as a form of precautionary saving eect, indeed, as we said, increasing θ has the consequence of reducing f * . This eect, on the one hand, decreases the (certain) consumption today but, on the other hand (besides decreasing the future consumption volatility) it increases the average value of the growth rate
Things are more articulated regarding the eect of society's aversion to uctuations. Indeed the eect is similar to the one we have in the standard deterministic benchmark AK growth model (see for instance Acemoglu [1] , Section 11.1). There we have a linear production function characterized by a technological level A (that in some sense corresponds to the parameter α of our model) and a discount ρ.
In the case of the AK model, the parameter φ appearing in the instantaneous utility
cannot be interpreted as risk aversion since the model is deterministic. φ is indeed the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, that is the uctuations aversion.
In that context the eect of increasing the uctuation aversion parameter φ depends on the sign of A − ρ: if A − ρ > 0 then increasing φ increases the initial consumption C(0) and reduce the positive growth rate, the opposite happens when A − ρ < 0. In both cases the eect of increasing φ is that of equalizing the consumption over time 6 .
Even if in our model there are more complex eects for instance due to the precautionary saving eect we have underlined above), the main mechanism is the same. Indeed the eect of φ depends on the value of α − ρ. When it is positive the bigger φ is, the bigger the initial consumption C(0) = f * A(0) is, and the smaller the average value of the growth rate (one can easily see that, as far as α − ρ > 0,
The average value of the growth rate is given by
and it has not to be confused with the the value of the growth rate of the average value of C(t) (or of A(t)) that is α, as shown in (11), when α − ρ < 0.
Indeed the result is rather intuitive since, when the dierence between the discount rate and the trend of agricultural productivity is positive, society is impatient and at the same time future prospects are on average rather poor. Both eects lead to better present outcomes than future outcomes. A society averse to uctuations logically wants to counteract these forces, and is thus willing to ensure against adverse outcomes in the future by conserving more biodiversity. The opposite occurs when ρ − α < 0.
Notice than when α > ρ, increasing risk aversion and aversion to uctuations has an ambiguous eect on the optimal conversion rate, since the two parameters characterizing preferences play in opposite directions.
In the situation described in Proposition 3.2 a complete description of the optimal dynamics of the system can be provided. We have indeed the following corollary of the previous result.
Corollary 3.4. Let the assumptions of Proposition 3.2 be satised. Then the optimal evolution of A(t) and C(t) are respectively:
and:
In particular
The dynamics of the optimal land productivity described in (10) is then a geometric Brownian motion, so that at any time t the distribution of A(t) is log-normal and has, respectively, the expected value and the variance described in (11) . Given the expression of the dynamics of A in (2), the growth rate of the expected value of A(t) only depends on the parameter α, while f * positively impacts its variance.
We now characterize the value function in the corner solution case.
Proposition 3.5. Let Hypothesis 3.1 be satised. Assume that
Moreover the optimal control is constant and deterministic, and it is given by:
for any t ≥ 0.
As underlined by the previous results, the structure of the value function is the same in the two cases (i.e. both are homogeneous of degree 1 − θ) but, of course the multiplicative constants dier. A corollary similar to Corollary 3.4 can be obtained in the corner case: the optimal dynamics of A(t) is described by (10) where, instead of f * , we have 1.
4
The value of biodiversity
In our model, the value of biodiversity comes from its ability to provide society with an insurance against the uctuations of agricultural productivity. We want to make here this property more precise, so that the value of biodiversity can be properly quantied. To do so, we build on the famous works by Lucas [20] , [21] on the welfare cost of uctuations.
In reference to Lucas [20] , [21] we dene and compute the value of biodiversity as the welfare cost of biodiversity losses. According to Lucas, the welfare cost of uctuations is the willingness to pay to avoid the uctuations of consumption around its deterministic trend. It is measured as the percentage of consumption the agents are ready to give up at all dates to be in the benchmark case (that is for him deterministic). In the same spirit, we dene here the welfare cost of biodiversity losses as the willingness to pay for the optimal biodiversity level 1 − f * compared to a reference level where all land is used for farming and biodiversity is nil. It is thus dened as follows:
Denition 4.1. The welfare cost of biodiversity losses is the percentage of consumption society is ready to give up at all dates to enjoy the optimal level of biodiversity, compared to no biodiversity at all.
The value function in the no-biodiversity case is denoted by V B (A) and is characterized in the following proposition. Let λ be the welfare cost dened above. According to Denition 4.1, λ satises:
Observe that when (12) is satised i.e. when we are at the optimum in the corner case f * = 1, the optimal and the no-biodiversity solution are equivalent so in this section we suppose that (6) is veried, i.e. that we are in the interior case at the optimum. We will also have a technical assumption to be able to characterize the explicit form of the welfare in the no-biodiversity case.
Proposition 4.2. Let Hypothesis 3.1 and Assumption (6) be satised and suppose that:
Then the welfare in the no-biodiversity case is given by:
Proof. See Appendix. thanks to (6) we have a < b. We distinguish two cases: φ > 1 and φ < 1 (we cannot have φ = 1 because of Hypothesis 3.1).
If φ > 1 the function (a, b) → a φ b 1−φ is convex and then
So, thanks to (5) we can conclude that β < β B (both are positive). Thanks to (5), when φ > 1,
we have θ > 1 thus the factor 1 1−θ is negative and, from the previous relation between β and β B , we can conclude that V B (A) < V (A) < 0 for any positive A.
Conversely, if φ < 1 the function (a, b) → a φ b 1−φ is concave and then β Proposition 4.5. The welfare cost of biodiversity losses is: Lemma 4.6. The value of biodiversity λ is an increasing function of the intrinsic volatility of agricultural productivity and of risk aversion. However, the eect of aversion to uctuations on the value of biodiversity is ambiguous.
The rst two results are intuitive and t well with the eects of intrinsic volatility and risk aversion on the conversion rate. Indeed, more intrinsic volatility of agricultural productivity and more risk aversion result in a lower optimal conversion rate i.e. more insurance, and a higher value of biodiversity, i.e. a higher welfare cost of biodiversity losses.
To investigate further the role of aversion to uctuations it is useful to look at the case where the optimal conversion rate is very high (f * close to 1). Lemma 4.7. For f * close to 1, 
When the optimal conversion rate is close to 1, the value of biodiversity is proportional to the square of the share of land optimally devoted to maintain biodiversity.
According to Assumption (6), we have:
2 θ − α φ > ρ − α; likewise, according to Assumption (16), we have:
The rst inequality implies that if ρ − α > 0, then dλ dφ > 0. The second one implies that if ρ − α + σ 2 4 θ < 0, then dλ dφ < 0; this requires ρ − α < 0 and, besides, is all the more likely since intrinsic volatility σ and risk aversion θ are small.
Simulations allow us to check that these results hold when f * is not supposed to be close to 1 (see Figure 1 for a case where ρ > α, Figures 2 and 3 for α > ρ). They also allow us to exhibit sets of parameters θ and φ such that, when α > ρ, we have dλ dφ > 0 (see Figure 3) .
At a rst look one could imagine that the signs of the eect of increasing aversion to uctuations (and in fact of any other parameter) on the value of biodiversity and on the share of land devoted to biodiversity conservation should be the same. It is actually what happens when the discount rate ρ is higher than the trend of productivity α. Then, increasing aversion to uctuations increases both the share of land devoted to biodiversity conservation and the value of biodiversity. It is also what happens when the discount rate ρ is lower than the trend of productivity α, that is when society is patient and has on average good economic prospects, and the intrinsic volatility and the risk aversion are small. Now, increasing the aversion to uctuations decreases both the share of land devoted to biodiversity conservation and the value of biodiversity. The need for insurance is low in these circumstances. Nevertheless, if we look for instance at the approximate expression (21) we can see that two eects are at work: on the one hand (lambda proportional to (1 − f * ) 2 ) the indirect eect (via f * ) of φ on the the value of biodiversity has the same sign of the eect of of φ on the share of land devoted to biodiversity conservation. This is not surprising because the bigger is f * the more the optimal biodiversity conservation situation is similar to the benchmark (where f = 1). On the other hand we have a direct eect (the term φ/2) through which increasing φ always increase λ. Indeed giving more and more importance to the absence of uctuations tends to give less and less value to situations where the trajectories are more volatile and in particular to give more value to the optimal biodiversity conservation situation with respect to the benchmark. When the discount rate ρ is lower than the trend of productivity α and the level of intrinsic volatility and the risk aversion are high the two eects are discordant and the second eect prevails. In this case, increasing the aversion to uctuations decreases the share of land devoted to biodiversity conservation and at the same time increases the value of biodiversity.
5
The conversion of a common-property resource: volatility externalities at work
We now consider a decentralized version of the model where two farmers can appropriate land, a common property resource, for farming purposes. The two farmers are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2} . The total amount of land available is still normalized to 1. Farmer i (i ∈ {1, 2}) may appropriate some share f i (t) of this total amount, knowing that the following constraint 
So the set of admissible strategies of player i (i ∈ {1, 2}) depends on the strategy chosen by the other player (denoted with f −i ). More precisely, given f −i (t), it has the following 
Given an admissible couple of strategies (f 1 (·), f 2 (·)) the total share of land devoted to farming at time t is f 1 (t) + f 2 (t) while the share of land used to preserve biodiversity at time
We assume that farmers 1 and 2 are potentially heterogeneous according to their farming activities (we will assume α 1 ≤ α 2 ), and according to their discount rates denoted ρ 1 and ρ 2 .
The productivity of a unit of land appropriated by farmer i for farming at time t ≥ 0 is given by:
The volatility externality comes from the fact that the conversion decisions of the two farmers aect the volatility of the agricultural productivity of each of them.
Given an F t -adapted [0, 1]-valued strategy f 2 (·) for the player 2 we will say that f 1 (·)
is a best response of player 1 to f 2 (·) if it is an optimal strategy (among all the strategies of
) for the optimization problem characterized by the state equation (24) (where we consider i = 1 and f 2 (·) = f 2 (·)) and Epstein-Zin-Weil utility function with a constant relative risk aversion θ, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution φ −1 and a discount rate ρ. Similarly we dene a best response of player 2 to some strategy f 1 (·) of player 1. A couple of [0, 1]-valued,
) is said to be a Nash equilibrium if f 1 (·) is a best response to f 2 (·) and f 2 (·) is a best response to f 1 (·).
Proposition 5.2. Provided that
1−φ 1−θ > 0, and that
the best response of farmer 1 for a constant and deterministic strategy f 2 (t) = f 2 ∈ (0, 1), t ≥ 0 of farmer 2 is the constant and deterministic strategy with value (27) and similarly for farmer 2.
and
then the couple of constant strategies (f 1 (t), f 2 (t)) = ( f 1 , f 2 ), for any t ≥ 0, where
is a Nash equilibrium. It is the unique Nash equilibrium in constant and deterministic strategies.
When the assumptions of Proposition 5.2 are veried the total amount of land devoted to farming activity is:
Denoting by ρ the average discount rate of the two players (ρ = (ρ 1 + ρ 2 )/2) and α the average trend of productivity in the economy (α = (α 1 + α 2 )/2) allows to write the total amount of land devoted to farming as:
If we compare this expression with (9) we observe that (since we suppose that condition (28) is veried) the total area of land devoted to farming in the 2-player case is larger than the optimal level:
Notice that the factor 2φ 2φ−1 measuring the increment in area devoted to farming is decreasing with the aversion to uctuations φ and tends to 1 when φ is very high. Hence a high aversion to uctuations tends to overcome the incentive that the two farmers face of appropriating too much land for their farming activity.
If we extend the analysis to the corner solution case where condition (29) is violated and
θφ ≥ 1, a continuous of deterministic and constant Nash equilibria arises and in correspondence of any of them the land used to maintain biodiversity is zero.
An analogous N -player version of the game can be studied. In this case, for any choice of parameters, letting N to innity induces a no-biodiversity preservation outcome. It can be seen as the usual situation when a large number of agents interact. This fact suggests that the reference level f = 1 studied in Section 4 is indeed a good benchmark. 6 Conclusion This paper presents a benchmark dynamic model including a particular motive for biodiversity conservation: its insurance value against uctuations of agricultural productivity. Producing food requires land, and increasing the share of total land devoted to farming mechanically reduces the share of land devoted to biodiversity conservation. However, the safeguarding of a greater number of species is associated to better ecosystem services pollination, ood control, pest control, etc., which in turn ensure a lower volatility of agricultural productivity.
The optimal conversion/conservation rule is explicitly characterized, as well as the value (in terms of the welfare cost of biodiversity losses) of biological diversity. The Epstein-Zin-Weil specication of the utility function allows us to disentangle the eects of risk aversion and aversion to uctuations. A two-player game extension of the model allows to highlight the eect of volatility externalities and the Paretian sub-optimality of the decentralized choices.
We identify at least two interesting extensions of our work.
First, we do not enter into the well known debate on rent sparing versus rent sharing initiated by Green et al. [14] . The debate aims at determining whether agriculture should be concentrated on intensively farmed land in order to conserve more natural spaces for biodiversity, or should be extensive, less productive, and wildlife-friendly. Our framework can encompass both cases. It would nevertheless be interesting to distinguish between the two management practices, which do not have the same consequences in terms of average agricultural productivity and of volatility.
Second, we consider here that the economy does not have access to nancial insurance and that there are no savings/storage possibilities. Indeed, if a nancial insurance system and/or a storage device were available, farmers could insure against adverse outcomes by other means than biodiversity conservation. Quaas and Baumgartner [25] study this problem and show in a static framework that both types of insurance (natural and nancial) are substitutes. It would be interesting to see whether their result holds in a dynamic framework, and how the arbitrage depends on risk aversion and aversion to uctuations, separately.
where V and V are the rst and the second derivative of V (A) and F (C, V ) is the aggregator dened in (4). This expression can be rewritten as:
We want to prove that the function dened in (7) is a solution of such an equation. We try to nd a solution of the form
for some β > 0. We have
So V of the prescribed form is a solution if and only if:
The f that maximizes this Hamiltonian is given by
(after nding the expression of β we will be able to show that this expression is indeed always in 
so (after some computations) if and only if:
Using this expression and (6) one can easily see that the expression of f * given in (40) is always in (0, 1) and then the control f (t) ≡ f * is admissible. Thanks to the general theory (see again Proposition 9
and Appendix C of Due and Epstein [7] ), since it is obtained as the feedback provided by a solution of the HJB of the problem it is the optimal control of the problem.
We now show that condition (5) guarantees the respect of the transversality condition.
The term ρ(1−θ) 1−φ V (A) appearing in the HJB (36) for the recursive utility corresponds to the standard term ρV (A) appearing in the standard HJB arising for separable expected utility functionals so the counterpart of the standard discount e −ρt is, in the recursive utility setting, given by e −ρ 1−θ 1−φ t (recall that, as already observed, if we choose φ = θ, the recursive utility case reduces to the separable expected utility).
Indeed to prove the verication result for our innite horizon case one has to argue as in the proof of Proposition 9 of Due and Epstein [7] using the functionṼ (t, A) = e 
that, using the expression of β C given in (14) and simplifying the term β C A Proof of Proposition 5.2. We start by characterizing the optimal response of player 1 given a certain xed deterministic constant strategy f 2 of player 2. To do this we solve the dynamic optimization problem where the value of f 2 is considered xed (and deterministic). We use again Proposition 9 and Appendix C of Due and Epstein [7] ) the value function V of the player 1's problem can be characterized as the solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation: 0 = sup 
